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The Economic Crisis: Its Effects in European 
Countries of the South
The recent severe economic downturn has led to some 
major detrimental effects for the involved population. 
Much attention has been devoted to the negative effects 
of the crisis and of the subsequent austerity measures on 
people’s health and well-being (e.g., Van Hal, 2015). Thus, 
it is extremely relevant that policymakers consider and 
support moderating mechanisms – not only of financial 
nature – in order to lessen such harmful effects. In this 
vein, the public understanding of the economic crisis is 
a first step to detect possible psychological coping strate-
gies.
With the objective to understand laypeople’s knowl-
edge and attitudes about the crisis, a research was con-
ducted in 2011–2012 in four European countries: France, 
Greece, Italy, and Portugal. Indeed, the economic crisis 
that followed the fall of Lehman Brothers in 2008 affected 
all four countries, albeit with a different magnitude, as 
was revealed by a whole set of indexes produced by inter-
national entities. For example, the indexes presented in 
Table 1 provide a comparison of the four countries dur-
ing the crisis years, with an emphasis on 2012, in terms of 
GDP, unemployment rates, public debt, human develop-
ment index, and Gini inequality index.
As may be seen in Table 1, in 2012 (the year when 
the core research was conducted), France had witnessed 
a small increase in its GDP; for Italy and Portugal, the 
GDP was stable, whereas Greece had witnessed a sharp 
decrease. Since then, although the other countries’ GDPs 
have increased over the years, Greece lost 14.80% of its 
GDP between 2008 and 2015.
In 2008, the countries had similar rates of unemploy-
ment, with Italy and France being in a slightly better 
condition. In 2012, the year of our data collection, unem-
ployment had increased in all countries. However, in Italy 
and France, it remained around 10%, whereas in the two 
countries under the supervision of the Troika (formed by 
the International Monetary Fund, the European Bank, 
and the European Commission), the employment rate 
increased considerably by doubling in Portugal and trip-
licating in Greece. This rate continued to increase in 2015 
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for Greece, Italy, and France, whereas it decreased by three 
points for Portugal. Importantly, the four countries cur-
rently occupy a negative position regarding youth unem-
ployment (2015 data). Greece, with 49.8%, is the second 
amongst OECD countries (the first is South Africa with 
50.1%) and the first among the EU countries, followed by 
Italy (40.3%), which is the third (the second is Spain with 
48.4%). Portugal is the fourth with 31.9%, and France 
is the sixth one (the Slovak Republic is the fifth country 
with 26.4%). Thus, in all countries presented here, young-
sters are harshly affected and have a difficult future in the 
respective national job market.
The public debt as a percentage of GDP was consider-
able in all four countries and increased during the cri-
sis years. For France, the public debt increased 32.64%, 
and for Italy it increased 28.29%. The largest increase 
between 2008 and 2015 was observed in the two coun-
tries under Troika’s supervision: Portugal (44.65%) and 
Greece (35.14%). It is worth noting that at the beginning 
of the crisis, France and Portugal had equivalent public 
debts. 
Finally, when our research was conducted in 2012, the 
four countries had similar inequality indexes (between 
33.1 for France and 36.7 for Greece, where the Gini index 
indicates 0 = total equality and 100 = total inequality), and 
in 2015 the UN reported similar Human Development 
Indexes (a composite index based on life expectancy, edu-
cation, and per capita income) for them (see Table 1 for 
the indexes). These similarities and differences amongst 
the countries make the context of this research consider-
ably rich and give some structural insight into our results. 
Although we are not in a position to claim relationships 
between our findings and the structural conditions, it is 
important to take them into consideration in the interpre-
tation of the results and the possible comparisons.
Lay Theories about the Economic Crisis
As shown by the above-mentioned statistics, the eco-
nomic crisis introduced sudden and decisive changes in 
individual and collective lives in European societies. It 
also led people to reconsider their understanding of how 
society functions, and to ask questions about why and 
how phenomena such as economic crises happen. Peo-
ple’s attempts to make sense of the situation gave rise to 
lay theories about the crisis that were the focus of sev-
eral studies. To analyse these socially co-constructed and 
shared theories, social representations theory appeared 
as a particularly appropriate approach (Moscovici 1981, 
1984).
In this theoretical framework, some studies have focused 
on identifying the structure of the representations of citi-
zens of different groups and different countries (e.g., Galli 
et al., 2010). Others have examined the effect of people’s 
financial position, feelings of vulnerability, and emotions 
on their willingness to take action against the austerity 
measures implemented in their country (Chryssochoou, 
Papastamou & Prodromitis, 2013; Poeschl, Valentim & 
Silva, 2015).
Several authors have analysed people’s explanations for 
the phenomenon and have paid attention to the discourses 
of the media. Indeed, in order to find the answers to their 
questions, people generally turn to the media, and social 
representations theory acknowledges their role in the con-
struction of lay representations. Incidentally, this role was 
described by Moscovici (1961/1976) in his seminal work 
on the representations of psychoanalysis. In this work, 
Moscovici showed how different newspapers and maga-
zines (Generalist Press, Catholic Press, and Communist Press) 
adopted different communication styles (respectively, dif-
fusion, propagation, and propaganda) in order to shape 
the representations and behaviours of their audience.
Table 1: Economic Indexes of France, Greece, Italy, and Portugal.
Index France Greece Italy Portugal
GDP
2008   35.12k   30.86k   35.15k   26.63k
2012   37.48k   25.28k   35.75k   26.45k
2015   41.03k   26.29k   37.22k   29.72k
Unemployment rate
2008     7.06     7.76     6.72     7.55
2012     9.40   24.44   10.65   15.53
2015   10.36   24.9   11.89   12.44
Public Debt
2008   81.5 117.5 113.0   82.8
2012 110.4 164.5 136.2 137.1
2015 121.0 181.2 157.6 149.6
Human Development*     0.886     0.865     0.872     0.827
GINI (inequality)   33.1   36.7   35.2   36.0
Note. Source: OECD (www.oecd.rg) except *United Nations (UNDP 2015). Data for the year of research (2012) in bold.
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It should be noted that for some years, studies  conducted 
in this theoretical field neglected to further analyse the 
link between media and representations. This might be 
due to the fact that according to communication theo-
rists, this link is difficult to assess, because the information 
transmitted by the media is discussed and reinterpreted in 
the interactions that take place within social groups (Lang 
& Lang 2006). It is nevertheless well established that the 
way in which the media present important events has an 
impact on the way people acquire and organise the infor-
mation on these events (Iyengar & Simon, 1993; see also 
Poeschl, Nogueira-Rodrigues & Ribeiro, 2017).
More recently, however, several studies have aimed at 
uncovering the influence of the media on laypeople’s 
representations, and this was particularly the case for the 
representations of threatening diseases (for a review, see 
Mayor et al., 2012). A great deal of attention was also given 
to the discourses of the media on the economic crisis, 
both by communication theorists (e.g., Abrudan, 2009; 
Álvarez-Peralta, 2011) and by authors working in the 
social representations approach. For example, de Rosa, 
Bocci, and Bulgarelli (2010) analysed the texts produced 
in a sample of print and digital media between 2008 and 
2009. The authors found in the discourses of experts and 
non-experts that a “bad finance”, associated with suspi-
cious virtual transactions, was responsible for the crisis 
and opposed to a “good economy”, associated with the 
work of real persons.
In turn, Rizzoli, Romaioli, and Contarello (2017) ana-
lysed the titles containing the word crisis of four Italian 
daily newspapers published between 2007 and 2013, 
looking for metaphors that enable to “visualise” the crisis. 
Despite the different political and ideological orientation 
of the newspapers, the authors noted some convergence 
in their messages over three periods. In a first period, the 
crisis was described as a distant phenomenon that could 
be kept away and so triggered indifference in the public. 
Then it was described as a contagious disease that had 
attained the Italian economy and for which Italian citi-
zens were unprepared. Last, the crisis was described as a 
natural catastrophe against which people were helpless. 
The authors concluded that the messages conveyed by the 
media discouraged laypeople to adopt proactive attitudes 
or behaviours to cope with the situation.
On the other hand, the authors who studied the social 
representations of the economic crisis have often referred 
to the importance of the media for the formation of these 
representations. For example, Gangl, Kastlunger, Kirchler, 
and Voracek (2012) compared the representations of the 
crisis and the representations of four related stakeholders 
(financial institutions/banks, managers/entrepreneurs, 
politicians/government, and consumers/customers) 
formed by Austrian experts and laypeople, with low versus 
high confidence in economic recovery. According to the 
authors, the comparison between experts and laypeople 
was relevant because even if the financial experts did not 
have a clear understanding of the causes of the crisis, they 
would be less influenced by the media. Results showed 
that laypeople predominantly blamed the managers, 
experts predominantly blamed the media, and both 
blamed the politicians.
These findings also illustrate that the attribution of 
responsibility is a common outcome of the process of 
sense making (Moscovici, 1984), and that in the case of 
threatening events, there is a tendency to put the blame 
on other social groups (Mayor et al., 2012). In this regard, 
O’Connor (2012) used semi-structured interviews fol-
lowed by an online survey to analyse lay perceptions of 
the causes of the Irish recession. The results of the sur-
vey showed that the recession was first attributed to the 
powerful people, then to the ordinary people, to eco-
nomic inevitability, and far less to the Irish Nation. The 
four causes had a significantly different importance in the 
explanation of the crisis, and there was no effect of sex, 
age or socioeconomic status.
These results are somewhat at odds with the findings of 
Leiser, Benita, and Bourgeois-Gironde (2016), who studied 
the attribution of responsibility for the 2008–2009 finan-
cial crisis in seven countries worldwide (the United States, 
France, Germany, Israel, Russia, Turkey, and China/Hong 
Kong). The authors found that respondents who lived 
in Western countries, were relatively wealthy, had some 
training in economics, and were less affected by the crisis 
tended to blame more the systemic features of the eco-
nomic system than the moral or cognitive failures of indi-
viduals, whereas the respondents living outside the West 
with no economic training tended to blame more the per-
sons than the system.
In the study presented here, laypeople were asked 
to give their opinions on a set of explanations for the 
economic crisis and on several possible strategies that 
their country might adopt to deal with the situation. 
The questions were formulated from the informa-
tion proposed by the Greek media, and we examined 
whether the formed theories had a common struc-
ture in three1 of the European countries participat-
ing in the research. Because, as we have seen, these 
countries have been differently affected by the crisis, 
our results should contribute to better understand 
the extent to which laypeople’s living conditions and 
 mass-mediated information shape lay representations 
in general and lay representations of the economic 
 crisis in particular.
Method
Participants
The total sample consisted of 1,806 respondents, 818 
men and 988 women aged 17–84 years (M = 37.10; 
SD = 15.42), from France (n = 558), Greece (n = 751), and 
Italy (n = 497). Our sample was opportunistic, and partici-
pants were either recruited via the Internet or approached 
by researchers in public spaces. This resulted in significant 
differences in the distribution of basic demographics (see 
Table 2). Females χ2(2, n = 1,806) = 31.94, p < 0.001, and 
working participants, χ2(2, n = 1,694) = 29.82, p < 0.001, 
were over-represented in the Italian sample, compared 
to France and Greece; also, they tended to be younger, 
F(2, 1803) = 48.36, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.22. 
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Measures
Perceived causes of the economic crisis. A pool of 33 
items was used to measure the various causes of the crisis, 
corresponding to interpretations of causality related to 
multiple levels of explanation (see Appendix 1). The items 
were constructed for the purposes of this research follow-
ing an examination of the explanations given in the media 
(press, TV, and blogs). All explanations were discussed 
amongst team members to ensure their relevance in each 
country. Responses were given on seven-point scales from 
1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). An English ver-
sion of the questionnaire was constructed (see Appendix 
1). Each participating team was responsible for translat-
ing and back-translating the questionnaires in the three 
languages. Team members compared questionnaires to 
ensure that translations were correct.
Proposed strategies to exit the economic crisis.
The instrument consisted of 11 items representing poli-
cies and measures that countries founding themselves in 
a debt crisis should follow (see Appendix 2). Again, the 
items were constructed following the propositions at 
stake at the time of the research. Responses were given on 
seven-point scales from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly 
agree).
Results
Perceived causes of the economic crisis
A series of exploratory principal component analyses with 
varimax rotation were performed. Inspection of the scree 
plot and parallel analysis findings (Fabrigar, Wegener, 
McCallum & Strahan, 1999) indicated that a six-factor 
solution was appropriate to best summarise the perceived 
causes of the economic crisis across the three countries 
with comparable samples (i.e., France, Greece, and Italy).2 
The cross-national invariance of this preliminary structure 
was further tested with a multigroup confirmatory factor 
analysis using AMOS 21. Factorial invariance is a prereq-
uisite for valid comparisons of scale scores across groups 
(Kline 2015; Milfont & Fisher, 2010). 
In order to increase the model fit, nine parcels were 
created from 18 items on the basis of their initial load-
ings, as follows: For each factor, the item with the high-
est loading formed a parcel along with the item with the 
lowest loading; the item with the second highest loading 
formed a parcel together with the item with the  second 
lowest loading, etc. (see Little, Rhemtulla, Gibson & 
Schoemann, 2013). It should be noted, however, that even 
the  lowest loadings were higher than .40. The structure 
of the pooled six-factor solution is presented in Figure 1, 
and the standardised regression weights for each of the 
three countries are given in Table 3.
The first factor consists of eight items, attributing the 
economic crisis to: “The very costly wars, Afghanistan, 
Iraq, etc.” (c15);3 “The lack of contemporary societies’ eco-
logical consciousness that lead to the depletion of natural 
resources” (c30); “People living exclusively on unemploy-
ment benefits” (c20); “The waste of energy by multina-
tional companies aimed to maximize their profits” (c24); 
“The gradual depletion of natural resources together with 
the rapid increase of the worldwide population” (c8); “The 
increase in the number of immigrants who constitute 
cheap labor force and take jobs from local people” (c25); 
“The decrease in the value of dollar compared to the Euro 
that made European products less competitive” (c23); and 
“The fact that Europe, by getting ‘old’ financially and pro-
ductively, becomes vulnerable to crises” (c26). All of these 
make reference to the depletion of resources.
The second factor depicts the weakness of the finan-
cial system (five items): “The bad administration of the 
globalized financial and credit system” (c22); “The fact 
that banks no longer aim to finance the real economy, 
commerce, and make investments but rather prefer to 
maximize their profits” (c27); “The factitious (notional) 
economy (stocks that were worth much less than were 
sold in the stock market, etc).” (c13); “The collapse of 
bonds based on toxic loans (the banks give loans with 
big profit, even though they may be uncertain that they 
will be getting their money back)” (c29); and “The bad 
investments of banks and other financial organisms” 
(c19).
The third factor interprets the crisis as planned by 
power-system conspiracy (three items): “The fact that the 
crisis is part of a bigger plan to create a global govern-
ance” (c11); “The fact that it is used as an excuse so that 
the rich become richer, and the poor poorer” (c32); and 
“The fact that financially powerful people manufacture 
the economic crisis in order to maintain their dominance 
and to ‘terrorize’ people” (c17).
The fourth factor attributes the crisis to the nature 
of system inequality (three items): “The uncontrolla-
ble free market and the economic liberalism” (c3); “The 
 unequal wealth distribution” (c4); and “The contemporary 
Table 2: Demographic Characteristics of Participants by Country.
Country
France  
(n = 558)
Greece  
(n = 751)
Italy 
(n = 497)
Sex Male (%) 49.4 48.9 34.4
Female (%) 50.6 51.1 65.6
Work Status Working (%) 57.1 48.1 64.6
Not Working (%) 42.9 51.9 35.4
Age Range 17–84 yrs 18–83 yrs 18–76 yrs
Mean (SD) 38.7 (17.4) 39.7 (14.9) 31.5 (15.5)
Papastamou et al: Attributing and Managing the Crisis 5
Figure 1: Confirmatory factor analysis of the perceived causes of the economic crisis (pooled data from Greece, France, 
and Italy; N = 1779; regression weights are standardized; all coefficients are statistically significant at α = .001).
Table 3: Standardized Regression Weights of the Perceived Causes of the Economic Crisis.
Items/Parcels France Greece Italy
Factor 1 c20 + c24 0.736 0.771 0.724
c30 + c15 0.670 0.717 0.669
c8 + c25 0.729 0.746 0.715
c23 + c26 0.628 0.627 0.610
Factor 2 c29 + c13 0.749 0.732 0.668
c27 + c22 0.826 0.704 0.710
c19 0.671 0.593 0.604
Factor 3 c11 + c32 0.853 0.830 0.864
c17 0.770 0.738 0.698
Factor 4 c4 + c3 0.765 0.792 0.701
c5 0.737 0.808 0.669
Factor 5 c1 + c9 0.841 0.892 0.800
c2 0.638 0.708 0.617
Factor 6 c6 0.689 0.643 0.728
c12 0.726 0.639 0.710
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businesses (global monopoly giants) whose only motive is 
the pursuit of profit” (c5). 
The fifth factor focuses on overconsumption as a cause of 
the crisis (three items): “The fact that the banks started to 
give loans recklessly to many households and businesses 
that did not have the capacity to pay back their debts” (c1); 
“The reckless use of credit cards by consumers” (c9); and 
“Overconsumption” (c2).
The sixth factor puts the blame on the weakness of the 
political system (two items): “The mishandling of the situ-
ation by the governments” (c6) and “The incompetence of 
the political system” (c12).
Multigroup CFA tested three hierarchical levels of invar-
iance – namely configural (i.e., the same underlying factor 
structure is found across groups), metric (i.e., the factor 
loadings are constrained to be equal, which suggests that 
the units of measurement are the same across groups), 
and scalar invariance (i.e., the intercepts are also sup-
posed to be equal, which suggests that group differences 
at the mean level are due to differences in the means of 
the underlying constructs) (Kline, 2015; Milfont & Fischer, 
2010). 
Acceptable invariance across the three countries was 
confirmed for the configural model, exploring the basic 
structure of the perceived causes of the economic crisis, 
as shown in Table 4. In addition, metric invariance was 
established, which is a precondition to examine structural 
relationships of perceived causes of the economic crisis 
with other constructs under study cross-nationally. In fact, 
Model 2 (metric invariance) had significantly improved fit 
compared to Model 1 (configural invariance). However, 
scalar invariance was not met, which implies that cross-
national comparison of the perceived causes of the eco-
nomic crisis at the mean level is not appropriate (see 
Table 4).
We then performed a Factorial Correspondence Analysis 
(Benzécri, 1992; Lebart, Piron & Morineau, 2006), using 
the six factor scores of the perceived causes of the eco-
nomic crisis as active variables in order to explore their 
structural relationships in the pooled data set. Data were 
analysed with the SPAD 5.0 software (Lebart, Morineau, 
Lambert & Pleuvret, 2000). As shown in Figure 2, the fac-
torial plan 1, 2 revealed different patterns of explanations 
for the economic crisis. Along the horizontal axis (31.30% 
of inertia), the interpretation of the crisis as planned by 
power-system conspiracy is contrasted with the interpre-
tation in terms of overconsumption. These explanations 
make a distinction between power or hegemony on the 
one hand, and people or the dominated on the other. On 
the vertical axis (24.31% of inertia), overconsumption, a 
psychological explanation focusing on personal behaviors 
and lifestyles, is confronted with the nature of system ine-
quality, which draws attention to macro-systemic agents 
and the economic and political status quo.
Table 4: Multigroup Confirmatory Factor Analysis of the Perceived Causes of the Economic Crisis.
Model (Invariance) χ2 df χ2/df CFI RMSEA SRMR Model 
 comparison
∆χ2 df ∆CFI
Model 1 (Configural) 820.51*** 225 3.647 0.931 0.039 0.044
Model 2 (Metric) 856.85*** 243 3.526 0.929 0.038 0.046 M1–M2 36.39** 18 0.002
Model 3 (Scalar) 2380.64*** 273 8.720 0.755 0.066 0.059 M2–M3 1523.79*** 30 0.174
Note. **p < 0.01. ***p < 0.001. Countries included in the analysis: France (n = 548), Greece (n = 739), and Italy (n = 492).
Figure 2: Factorial Correspondence Analysis on the perceived causes of the economic crisis (factorial axes 1, 2).
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Mean levels of agreement with the perceived causes 
of the economic crisis within each of the three countries 
were examined with separate repeated-measures ANOVAs. 
These analyses suggested that perceptions of the causes 
of the economic crisis varied considerably within  country 
(see Table 5). This was especially true for Italy, F(5, 2440) 
= 450.71, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.48, Greece, F(5, 3690) = 
437.80, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.37, and to a lesser extent France, 
F(5, 2775) = 147.66, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.21. Multiple compar-
isons with the Bonferroni post-hoc test showed that the 
economic crisis is perceived primarily as a weakness of the 
political system in Greece and in Italy, but as a weakness of 
the financial system in France. The possibility that the cri-
sis was planned by power-system conspiracy is given more 
attention in Greece, where it was ranked second, than in 
France and in Italy, where it was ranked last. In all three 
countries, the nature of system inequality reached moder-
ate levels of agreement, compared to other explanations 
of the crisis, while depletion of resources and overcon-
sumption were amongst the least popular causes.
The possible causes of the crisis are in line and enrich 
those found in the two above-mentioned studies, con-
ducted in Ireland (O’Connor, 2012) and Austria (Gangl et 
al., 2012). The variation in the level of blame attributed 
to these causes according to the countries supports the 
notion that the attribution of responsibility for the crisis 
depends on social positions or societal conditions.
Proposed strategies to exit the economic crisis
Exploratory principal components analyses (using vari-
max rotation) of the proposed measures to deal with the 
economic crisis in the pooled data from three countries 
with comparable samples (i.e., France, Greece, and Italy) 
indicated a three-factor structure on the basis of scree 
test and parallel analysis (Fabrigar et al., 1999). The coeffi-
cients of the confirmatory factor analysis for this solution 
are presented in Figure 3.
The first factor includes five items related to the appli-
cation of austerity measures, suggesting that countries 
should “Concede decision-making power to the EU, IMF 
and European Central Bank” (m9);4 “Accept to have a 
Table 5: Factor Means and Repeated-Measures ANOVAs of the Perceived Causes of the Economic Crisis within 
Countries.
France 
(N = 556)
Greece 
(N = 739)
Italy 
(N = 490)
F1. Depletion of resources 4.12c 3.96e 4.05d
F2. Weakness of the financial system 5.42a 5.29b 5.29b
F3. Planned by power-system conspiracy 4.20c 5.37b 3.65e
F4. Nature of system inequality 5.15b 5.15c 5.09c
F5. Overconsumption 4.22c 4.95d 4.00d
F6. Weaknesss of the political system 5.08b 6.31a 6.07a
F 147.66*** 437.80*** 450.71***
Partial η2 0.210 0.372 0.480
Note. ***p < 0.001. Different letters indicate significant differences between pairs of means at α = 0.05 according to Bonferroni 
post-hoc test (within-country ANOVAs).
Figure 3: Confirmatory factor analysis of the proposed 
strategies to exit the economic crisis (pooled data 
from Greece, France, and Italy; N = 1785; regression 
weights are standardized; all coefficients are statistically 
significant at α = .001; dotted arrows indicate non-
significant relationships).
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reduced management of their finances” (m6); “Implement 
rigorously austerity measures in relation to salaries and 
pensions” (m1); “Implement a technocratic government” 
(m7); and “Increase direct and indirect taxation” (m2). In 
short, it proposes conforming to EU requests.
The second factor consists of three items – “Reduce 
bureaucracy to attract private investment” (m10); “Restrict 
public sector spending” (m3); and “Implement measures 
that do not threaten social cohesion” (m11) – which rep-
resent the rationalization of the public sector as a response 
to the economic crisis.
The third factor is composed of two items corresponding 
to the EU exit solution, “Leaving the Eurozone voluntarily” 
(m4) and “Refuse to pay the debt” (m5), which represent 
an extremely conflictual response to the economic crisis 
and its management imposed by the dominant interna-
tional forces.
Multigroup confirmatory factor analysis failed to estab-
lish cross-national invariance of the above structure. As 
shown in Table 6, the fit indices for the configural model 
indicated poor stability of the factor structure of the pro-
posed measures for the economic crisis across countries. 
Therefore, inspection of any further tests of equivalence 
(i.e., metric and scalar invariance) was not necessary, 
although the respective indices were estimated. This find-
ing suggests that the structure of the conceptual meaning 
of the proposed measures for the economic crisis differs 
significantly across countries, and therefore it should be 
examined within the specific socioeconomic and cultural 
context (see also Mari et al., 2017; Poeschl et al., 2017; 
Prodromitis, Chryssochoou & Papastamou, 2017). 
Discussion
The analysis revealed dimensions that cover a wide range 
of explanations of the economic crisis at different levels 
of abstraction that make reference to different ideologi-
cal and value foundations. In particular, we observe causes 
that attribute the crisis to the political system and the 
bad administration of governments (sixth factor), or that 
attribute the responsibility to the citizens and their reck-
less consumerist behaviour (fifth factor). These two expla-
nations, which illustrate the tendency to put the blame on 
others (O’Connor, 2012), are often opposed in the public 
rhetorical debate. The first one concerns a popular belief 
that expresses a generalised disappointment with the 
political system. It is related to apathy and lack of inter-
est in politics and could also lead to political cynicism 
(Bynner & Ashford, 1994). Related, Mari et al. (2017) did 
not find any effect of this perceived cause on intention 
to participate in legal or illegal forms of political activism 
realised in order to overcome the crisis. It might, how-
ever, also be at the centre of a contestation of the power 
status quo, as shown recently by Marchlewska, Cichocka, 
Panayiotou, Castellanos, and Batayneh (2017): when the 
in-group is perceived in a disadvantaged position, people 
tend to increase their level of populism, along with col-
lective narcissism. The second explanation referring to 
overconsumption puts the blame on citizens’ behaviour; 
it legitimises the imposition of hard measures in order 
to punish them and lead them to approve the dominant, 
neo-liberal model of economic and social order. 
In addition, we observe a conspirational logic (third 
factor) that pushes to the extremes the critical stance 
towards the power of supra-national elites, and that could 
be one of the main organizing principles of populist 
beliefs (Castanho Silva, Vegetti & Littvay, 2017). Besides 
these dimensions that reflect the two poles of the organ-
ised sociopolitical system (governing-governed), we find 
explanations that refer to systemic dysfunctions. In par-
ticular, the first (depletion of resources) and the second 
(weakness of the financial system) factors refer to mac-
rosocietal parameters of resource administration and 
problems regarding the way global society regulates its 
reproduction. Finally, we observe a holistic critique that 
targets the nature of the capitalistic system (fourth fac-
tor, the nature of system inequality), which addresses a 
critique to the structure and “logic” of its functioning: a 
constant reproduction of inequalities as a result of the 
uncontrolled functioning of the markets and the unidi-
mensional pursuit of gains.
Our findings, therefore, indicate the existence of a struc-
tured way of understanding the causes of the crisis across 
the three countries, which seems to reveal some similarity 
in the discourses of the media. This similarity produces 
common organizing principles (Doise, 1990) of reason-
ing and meaning making of the economic crisis as it 
appeared in the shared representations of the three coun-
tries of the European Union. However, scalar invariance 
failed to be established; this suggests that there are differ-
ences between France, Greece, and Italy as to how these 
dimensions are processed inside each country. Because 
the intercept for the evaluation of the causes of the cri-
sis is different in the three countries, a comparison of the 
means of these dimensions between countries would be 
misleading. This may be due to the fact that in each coun-
try a different emphasis is given to these causes by the 
media, or that there are different norms of evaluation of 
the causes of the economic crisis (Prodromitis et al., 2017). 
Table 6: Multigroup Confirmatory Factor Analysis of the Proposed Measures for the Economic Crisis.
Model (Invariance) χ2 df χ2/df CFI RMSEA SRMR Model 
 comparison
∆χ2 df ∆CFI
Model 1 (Configural) 632.12*** 96 6.585 0.808 0.056 —
Model 2 (Metric) 770.89*** 110 7.008 0.763 0.058 — M1–M2 138.77*** 14 0.045
Model 3 (Scalar) 1891.26*** 130 14.548 0.368 0.087 — M2–M3 1120.37*** 20 0.395
Note. **p < 0.01. ***p < 0.001. Countries included in the analysis: France (n = 556), Greece (n = 739), and Italy (n = 490). SRMR was 
not calculated because the model was not successfully fitted.
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Moreover, we found differences in the way citizens of the 
different countries prioritise the causes. Greece and Italy 
prioritise the weakness of the political system, whereas 
France prioritise the weakness of the financial system. We 
could speculate that the social conditions and the history 
of each country could explain these differences. Greeks 
and Italians, with unstable political contexts, are more 
inclined to attribute the responsibility to their political 
system, whereas the French claim the financial system is 
responsible for the crisis. The latter result is in line with 
the findings of Lemoine, Dariet, Kmiec, and Roland-Lévy 
(2017), who found that the central core of the social rep-
resentation of the economic crisis in a French sample is 
unemployment, along with banks, finance, and recession, 
as peripheral elements, especially for people experienc-
ing high levels of economic threat. Interestingly, the crisis 
viewed as the outcome of a conspiracy was more popular 
amongst Greek participants. As observed by Knight (2013), 
the severe economic situation and the harsh austerity 
measures that changed dramatically the everyday life of 
Greek citizens may have produced the idea that there is a 
conspiracy plan against them. This might have diffuse the 
anxiety of the event in the population (Franks, Bangerter 
& Bauer, 2013), thus contributing to the increase of a con-
spiracy belief that may have served as meaning making in 
a threatening situation (van Prooijen, Krouwel & Pollet, 
2015). Further research, perhaps of qualitative nature, 
may be able to clarify these differences amongst countries.
Our analysis concerning the lay causal explanations of 
the economic crisis implies that a common ground under-
lies the pattern of relations between different perceived 
causes of the crisis. Participants in each country share 
common perceptions of the mechanisms that produce the 
crisis, although they have a different hierarchy of these 
causes.
From these data, a social representation seems to 
emerge. This representation is organised around an axe 
that opposes individual blame (overconsumption) to the 
responsibility of powerful and unknown others (con-
spiracy). This axe might reflect the opposition between 
causes for which ordinary people have the power to do 
something about (stop overconsuming) and causes for 
which ordinary people are powerless (conspiracy). The 
second axe that structures the representation opposes 
these “man-made” causes to causes that are endemic to 
the system. Further research should clarify the factors 
that constitute anchoring points of this representation 
and determine individual positioning on these axes (for 
an attempt to clarify some factors, see Mari et al., 2017).
Concerning the measures that should be followed to 
overcome the crisis, the analysis revealed three different 
general “logics” that could be appraised on a continuum: 
from the complete compliance and subordination of the 
nation-states to the requirements of supra-national insti-
tutions, we pass through the equilibrating logic of a devel-
opment that conserves the social cohesion (though by 
reducing the public sector that constitutes the core force 
of the state) and arrive at a logic of extreme conflict that 
proposes the refusal to pay the debt and the exiting from 
the Eurozone.
Each of these axes of the measures to deal with the crisis 
refers to a different ideological processing of this “holis-
tic event” (see also Mari et al., 2017). They also relate to 
the particular socio-historical context of each country and 
the ideological rhetoric that is used in the current politi-
cal debate. For instance, in the case of the Greek crisis, 
the two opposed logics of “compliance with the memo-
randum” versus “Grexit” express the core ideological and 
political debate regarding not only the tackling of the 
crisis but also more general issues of identity negotiation 
concerning the priority people give to their national or 
class memberships (e.g., Brubaker, 2009; Yogeeswaran & 
Dasgupta, 2014). In addition, the principle “rationaliza-
tion of the public sector” may be a synthesis of a bipo-
lar dimension “development and social cohesion,” but it 
could also imply important ideological oppositions that 
refer to the “public-private” axis. This dimension is funda-
mental for the meaning making of central issues of the 
current era like conceptualizations of economic develop-
ment versus the welfare state.
To conclude, we would say that our findings map the 
organizing principles of explanation and therapy of the 
crisis and could be a useful starting point for further 
research. An additional test and validation of the meas-
uring material in different environments, as well as the 
consideration of similarities and differences between 
countries inside the common (but not as it appears homo-
geneous) framework of the European Union could be 
welcome. 
Additional Files
The additional files for this article can be found as follows:
• Appendix 1. Perceived Causes of the Economic 
Crisis Questionnaire. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5334/
irsp.148.s1
• Appendix 2. Proposed Measures for the Economic 
Crisis Questionnaire. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5334/
irsp.148.s2
Notes
 1 Because the Portuguese sample consisted only of 
 students, it was not included in this analysis.
 2 Note that the complete data reported in this paper are 
available at https://osf.io/wtacy.
 3 The coding names c1, c2, etc. correspond to the 
 consecutive appearance of the items (see Appendix 1).
 4 The coding names m1, m2, etc. correspond to the 
 consecutive appearance of the items (see Appendix 2).
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